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 Human rights and corruption are two fields of study that are gaining increased attention 
in the business world. In the realm of human rights, organized attempts to define and prevent 
abuses have largely been a phenomenon of the past 60 years. With the drafting, adoption, and 
signing of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the global community definitively 
announced that human rights considerations are relevant and common to all peoples.1 Although 
many countries continue to have poor track records of human rights, the signatories of the 
UDHR have at least agreed in principle to their importance. The landmark document has been 
the foundation of the efforts of various non-governmental and intergovernmental organizations 
seeking to ensure that state parties abide by the declaration’s articles. Today, the influence of 
these organizations has expanded to the private sector and forced multinational corporations to 
reconsider the business strategies they employ in their operations abroad. 
 Structured interest in defining and curbing corruption, on the other hand, began just 30 
years ago. Global uptake of this interest has been slow, and only recently has the international 
community drafted a document – the United Nations Convention against Corruption – that is 
potentially as important to the anti-corruption movement as the UDHR is to the human rights 
movement.2 The diverging opinions of the global community regarding the definition of 
corruption and what constitutes its externalities, as well as the written work of several academics 
suggesting that corruption has positive ramifications for society, have significantly contributed to 
the lengthy delay. Now that the convention exists, however, NGOs and IGOs dedicated to 
curbing corruption possess a potentially powerful tool for advancing their efforts. 
                                                 
1
 The U.N. General Assembly adopted the UDHR on December 10, 1948.  
2
 The U.N. General Assembly adopted the U.N. Convention against Corruption on October 31, 2003. 
 Given the recognized importance of preventing human rights abuses, an analysis of the 
human rights violations resulting from corruption would further strengthen the argument against 
it. This paper will consequently attempt to uncover the human rights implications of corruption 
and examine how MNCs are contributing to its persistence. A discussion will follow concerning 
possible measures for combating corruption and the impact of these recommendations on global 
corporate strategies. 
 
Background – Human Rights 
 During World War II, extensive human rights abuses turned many nations into advocates 
for an international organization committed to preventing such abuses from recurring. That 
organization would later materialize as the U.N., which would play an integral role in outlining 
human rights issues. The U.N.’s most significant contribution to human rights is the UDHR, 
which some academics have even declared to be “the most important legal document in the 
history of the world.”3 From the UDHR emerged two U.N. covenants – the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights – that codified human rights into binding international treaties.4 These covenants, 
along with the two optional protocols to the ICCPR, comprise what is now known as the 
International Bill of Human Rights. 
 The separation of economic and political rights was a direct function of the Cold War rift 
between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. With the U.S. refusing to 
guarantee the economic rights stipulated by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, and the 
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 Robert F. Drinan, The Mobilization of Shame: A World View of Human Rights (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2001) 9. 
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 The ICESCR was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on December 16, 1966, and entered into force on 
January 3, 1976. The ICCPR was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on December 16, 1966, and entered into 
force on March 23, 1976. 
U.S.S.R. equally adamant in refusing to guarantee certain political rights, the International Bill of 
Human Rights was consequently divided into two treaties. The U.S. still has not ratified the 
ICESCR, using principles of free market capitalism as its justification for opposition. The 
adoption of the 1993 Vienna declaration was a sign of progress in repairing the division of 
economic and political rights into separate categories of human rights. However, significant 
outstanding issues in this research field remain, such as the blatant discrepancy between theory 
and practice, and what enforcement mechanisms are necessary to close this gap. 
 The human rights movement today is led by NGOs like Amnesty International, founded 
in 1961 and focused on “preventing and ending grave abuses of the rights to physical and mental 
integrity, freedom of conscience and expression, and freedom from discrimination, within the 
context of its work to promote all human rights.”5 The organization’s annual reports provide 
detailed accounts of the human rights violations occurring throughout the world. The U.S. 
Department of State also issues an annual report concerning each country’s standing with respect 
to those human rights outlined in the ICESCR and the ICCPR. 
 
Background – Corruption 
 Support for anti-corruption measures has increased significantly during the last 15 years. 
Academic and practitioner interest in corruption, especially with respect to the role that MNCs 
play in allowing and encouraging its persistence, has led to the formation of anti-corruption 
coalitions, detailed analyses of corruption’s negative externalities, and sponsored research by 
prominent NGOs and IGOs seeking to identify corruption’s sources via case studies. 
 Interest in actively combating corruption began in the 1970s as a result of the Watergate 
and Lockheed Martin scandals, which involved domestic campaign funding and international 
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 For further information about Amnesty International, see www.amnesty.org (last visited April 27, 2004). 
business, respectively. The fallout from these scandals led to the development of the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, which was met with initial skepticism from the rest of the world. 
It was not until the fall of the U.S.S.R. and the emergence of highly publicized domestic scandals 
in other developed countries that the international community saw the urgent need for adopting 
anti-corruption measures. In 1993, Transparency International, an organization dedicated to 
curbing corruption, was formed and has become one of the leading resources for corruption 
researchers. The organization’s website provides corruption surveys, country and issues papers, 
and other publications relevant to academics and practitioners worldwide. 
 A number of international organizations have also contributed to the anti-corruption 
effort at the regional level.6 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development took 
the boldest step against corruption by adopting the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International Business Transactions in 1997. Entering into force in 1999, the 
convention criminalized bribery of foreign public officials. The Council of Europe established 
the Group of States against Corruption in 1998 to monitor member states’ efforts in promoting 
the Guiding Principles for the Fight against Corruption, and also passed the Criminal Law 
Convention on Corruption in 1999. The Organization of American States adopted the Inter-
American Convention against Corruption in 1996, calling on member states to criminalize 
bribery by developing national legislation based on the FCPA. The recent adoption of the U.N. 
Convention against Corruption by the General Assembly, and subsequent signing by 106 state 
parties, is an outgrowth of these regional efforts. 
 Progress in the fight against corruption, however, has not received blanket support from 
the worldwide academic community. Some critics suggest that corruption is an effective 
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 David Hess and Thomas W. Dunfee, “Fighting Corruption: A Principled Approach; The C2 Principles (Combating 
Corruption),” Cornell International Law Journal 33.3 (2000): 602-603. 
mechanism for evading inefficient bureaucratic red tape.7 In response, anti-corruption advocates 
note that bribery actually incentivizes corrupt officials to develop more hurdles, solicit bigger 
bribes, and create more elaborate extortion schemes.8 
 The manner in which the forerunners in the fight against corruption have defined the term 
is also considered by some critics to be a form of Western cultural imperialism, in that it 
condemns types of gift giving historically acceptable in other societies.9 The signing of the U.N. 
Convention against Corruption by a geographically and economically diverse group of 106 state 
parties, however, indicates that fighting corruption is not simply a Western concept. The 
widespread acknowledgement of the historic document also implies that critics of anti-corruption 
advocates are no longer in the majority amongst the global community. 
 Still others point to the supposed economic benefits of corruption, noting that bribery 
prevents excessive wage inflation and creates a necessary price floor for certain goods and 
services in imperfect markets.10 However, economic and statistical studies seem to contradict 
those claims. For example, two researchers seeking to determine the causes of economic 
corruption found that corruption is pervasive in many African and Latin American countries with 
low levels of economic growth.11 While the results of such studies often include subjective scales 
and opinions that slightly impair their objectivity, the secretive nature of corruption limits the 
availability of hard empirical data. Consequently, researchers look to alternative approaches in 
attempting to establish the negative externalities of corruption. 
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 Nathaniel H. Leff, “Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption,” American Behavioral Scientist 8.3 
(1964): 8-14. 
8
 Abdiweli M. Ali and Hodan S. Isse, “Determinants of Economic Corruption: A Cross-Country Comparison,” Cato 
Journal 22.3 (2003): 451. 
9
 James C. Scott, Comparative Political Corruption (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1972). 
10
 Francis T. Lui, “Three Aspects of Corruption,” Contemporary Economic Policy 14.3 (1996): 26-29. 
11
 Ali 449-466. 
Literature Review 
 While several researchers have mentioned in passing that there is a link between human 
rights and corruption, few have attempted to draw a tangible connection between the two fields 
of study. TI has sponsored the vast majority of the research seeking to describe the relationship 
between the two fields. Economist Laurence Cockcroft, a member of the TI Board of Directors, 
asserts that the human rights movement and anti-corruption movement have a lot in common.12 
He suggests that transparency and accountability are correlated with both greater respect for 
human rights and lower levels of corruption. Cockcroft believes that making advances in the 
human rights and anti-corruption movements is dependent on the responsible development of 
national integrity by civil society. 
 Constitutional law expert Nihal Jayawickrama asserts that corruption violates human 
rights by grouping corruption into two categories, petty corruption and grand corruption, and 
describing how these forms of corruption lead to violations of the UDHR, ICESCR, and 
ICCPR.13 While Jayawickrama outlines an effective framework for considering the link between 
the two research fields, his arguments are based on seemingly broad anecdotal examples of 
corruption and lack a specific, systematic treatment of documented instances of corruption. 
 Mary Robinson, executive director of the Ethical Globalization Initiative and former U.N. 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, noted in TI Global Corruption Report 2004 that the 
relationship between human rights and corruption demands further consideration. She pointed 
out that if human rights violations and corruption are linked, then respecting human rights could 
serve as an important aid in the anti-corruption movement. Analyzing the human rights 
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 Laurence Cockcroft, “Corruption and Human Rights: A Crucial Link,” Berlin, 1998, 1-5. 
13
 Nihal Jayawickrama, “Corruption – A Violation of Human Rights?” Sofia, 1998, 1-6. 
implications of corruption could potentially make human rights law an effective mechanism for 
combating corruption in courts and lead the public to more fervently reject corruption.  
 
Methodology 
 The first step in examining the human rights implications of corruption was identifying 
classifications of corruption. After considering several different approaches presented in the 
writings of corruption researchers, it was decided that the institutional grouping used in the TI 
Global Corruption Barometer survey would serve as the most effective means for dividing 
corruption into subcategories. The survey, commissioned from Gallup International in July 2002, 
asked 30,487 citizens in 44 countries, “If you had a magic wand and you could eliminate 
corruption from one of the following institutions, what would your first choice be?” The survey 
offered 11 specific choices, which were business licensing, courts, customs, education system, 
immigration, medical services, police, political parties, private sector, tax revenue, and utilities. 
The three categories with the highest overall percentage of respondents – political parties 
(29.7%), courts (13.7%), and police (11.5%) – were determined to be the most valuable for 
research. This conclusion assumes that the respondents want to eliminate corruption from the 
institutions that they perceive to be the most corrupt.14 
 The next step was to identify human rights laws and norms applicable to corrupt 
activities. Given the historical importance of the U.N. in the human rights movement, its 
documents were analyzed to pinpoint the human rights that MNCs were responsible for 
acknowledging and encouraging. Violations of these rights, as a result of corrupt actions, would 
then serve to establish the link between the two fields of study and further substantiate the 
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 Further assuming that perceptions reflect reality, the greatest amount of useful data, which are allegations of 
corruption, should concern the three institutions mentioned. 
position of anti-corruption advocates. The U.N. Human Rights Sub-Commission provides a list 
of human rights that companies must respect and promote. 
• Right to equal opportunity and non-discriminatory treatment 
• Right to security of person 
• Rights of workers (companies shall not use forced or compulsory labor, shall respect the rights of 
children, shall provide a safe and healthy workforce, shall provide workers with remuneration that 
allows for an adequate standard of living for them and their families, shall ensure the freedom of 
association and the right to collective bargaining) 
• Respect for national sovereignty and human rights (including not paying bribes, ensuring that the 
company’s goods and services are not used to abuse human rights, respecting civil, cultural, economic, 
political and social rights in particular, the rights to development, adequate food and drinking water, 
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, adequate housing, education, freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion, freedom of opinion) 
• Consumer protection 
• Environmental protection 
 
This list is valuable because it draws a specific connection between MNCs and human rights. 
Supplementing this list are the UDHR, ICESCR, and ICCPR. 
 In drawing the link between human rights and corruption empirically, a number of 
different methods were considered. One possible strategy was searching through the press 
releases of the general media for well-publicized instances of corruption. This strategy, however, 
was rejected on the basis of being too abstract and broad. Another potential method was 
identifying instances in which the World Bank and International Monetary Fund withheld aid 
packages in response to rampant corruption in a given country. This method was later abandoned 
on the grounds of lacking identifiable acts of corruption attributed to the withholding of aid 
packages, which makes analysis very difficult. 
 Ultimately, legal cases brought under the Alien Tort Claims Act served as an effective 
springboard for identifying specific, well-publicized events whose background allowed for 
analysis through the lens of human rights and corruption. The ATCA, adopted in the U.S. in 
1789, states that “district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for 
a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” The act 
was largely inactive for 200 years before becoming a vehicle by which victims of international 
law violations abroad filed suits in U.S. courts.15 
 While quite a number of cases have been filed under the ATCA, only the 26 cases 
brought against MNCs were considered for analysis, given the paper’s focus on the role of 
business in allowing corruption to persist.16 The background of these cases, laid out in case 
transcripts and general press releases, was reviewed to identify allegations of corruption related 
to political parties, courts, and police.17 The examples described in the results are the cases that 
best matched the prescribed categories of corruption. 
 It is important to note that allegations, and not findings of liability, are serving as the 
basis for the analysis in this paper. All of the cases mentioned were dismissed on procedural 
grounds or pending review, meaning that there was no substantive resolution of the issues 
brought under the ATCA. While it is impossible to ascertain which party would prevail if each 
case were permitted to proceed, this paper assumes that the allegations brought by the plaintiffs 
are true for what they reveal concerning the human rights implications of corruption. 
 
Political Corruption 
 A classification of corruption that has important human rights implications is political 
corruption, in which political leaders use the control and authority bestowed upon them on behalf 
of the general public interest for their personal benefit. The resulting private gain can consist of 
both financial profit and greater political influence in society. The scale of this private gain from 
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 The ATCA itself is now coming under fire from the Bush administration and USA*Engage, a National Foreign 
Trade Council-affiliated coalition seeking to “inform policymakers, opinion-leaders, and the public about the 
counterproductive nature of unilateral sanctions.” USA*Engage seeks to repeal or sharply limit the extent to which 
the ATCA can be applied. The appropriate interpretation of the ATCA will not be discussed here in further detail, 
except to note that the U.S. Supreme Court is currently in the midst of determining the scope of the ATCA for the 
first time ever in its review of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain. 
16
 See www.usaengage.org for a comprehensive listing of current and recent ATCA cases. 
17
 It was assumed that all of the cases were related to abuses of human rights, given the nature of the ATCA. 
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 The importance of combating political corruption was highlighted by the TI 2003 GCB 
survey, in which 29.7% of respondents selected political parties as the institution from which 
they would most like to see corruption eliminated. Citizens of 33 of the 45 polled countries, and 
at least 10% of the respondents of each polled country, ranked political parties as their first 
choice. Political corruption is most often associated with campaign financing and election 
processes, but also takes on other forms, such as the regulatory influence of MNCs in developing 
countries.19 
 This type of political corruption exists in both legal and illegal forms. Regulatory 
influence of MNCs occurs in a legal context when weak legislation permits the financial benefits 
resulting from the negotiation and signing of public contracts to flow in part to corrupt officials. 
It takes place in an illegal context when public officials are directly paid bribes, a practice 
criminalized by the FCPA and the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. 
 Regulatory influence of MNCs in developing countries persists because both the MNC 
and the foreign government are eager to establish a long-standing relationship. From the MNC’s 
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 These forms of political corruption concern the spending levels of political parties on election campaigns and the 
lack of transparency regarding the sources of campaign funding. 
point of view, a strong relationship may enable it to avoid costly compliance with environmental 
laws or obtain favorable changes in those laws. In the energy industry, for example, the 
operations of oil and natural gas exploration and production companies like ExxonMobil, British 
Petroleum, and ChevronTexaco create enormous amounts of toxic waste that must be removed in 
accordance with local environmental standards. The ability to circumvent these standards 
significantly lowers operating costs and raises profit margins. From the foreign government’s 
perspective, a close relationship will encourage the MNC to expand its operations, leading to 
more foreign direct investment, tax revenue, and local jobs. 
 The foreign government is consequently willing to accept noticeable discrepancies 
between the environmental standards of its own country and the MNC’s home country. Often, 
this discrepancy is viewed by developing countries as an integral part of enticing FDI. The lax 
standards that result, along with lax regulation, lead to physical injuries and deaths, 
environmental damage, and other human rights abuses. 
 The energy industry is particularly susceptible to this form of political corruption because 
of the grand scale of fossil fuel E&P operations. The initial investment for E&P companies, 
which covers the cost of aerial and seismic surveys, exploratory drilling, appraisals, 
development, and production, can amount to tens of millions of dollars. It is thus much easier to 
hide corrupt payments in this business than in others that are less capital-intensive. Cost 
overruns, a vehicle through which corrupt payments are often disguised, may be small in relative 
terms but still amount to enormous sums in absolute terms. Consequently, reported investment 
costs do not reflect fair market value, but instead include concealed subsidies eventually paid out 
to public officials as bribes.20 
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 Shaxson, Nicholas, “The Elf Trial: Political Corruption and the Oil Industry,” Global Corruption Report 2004 
(London: Pluto Press, 2004). 
 One ATCA case that particularly highlights the dangers of MNC regulatory influence in 
developing countries is Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, in which plaintiffs alleged that the 
energy giant was involved in abuses of human rights in Nigeria.21 These violations include the 
hangings of two leaders of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People, the torture of 
another leader, and the shooting of a peaceful protestor during the mid-1990s.22 All three of these 
actions are direct violations of the ICCPR. Article 6.1 of the covenant states: 
Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be 
arbitrarily deprived of his life. 
 
Article 7 of the ICCPR states: 
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In 
particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation. 
 
Article 21 of the covenant states: 
The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this 
right other than those imposed in conformity with the law and which are necessary in a democratic society 
in the interests of national security or public safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals 
or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
 
Royal Dutch Petroleum had also been accused of ongoing environmental destruction in the 
Ogoni region and several breaches of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. 
 According to plaintiff allegations, Royal Dutch Petroleum established a close relationship 
with the Nigerian government by continuously supplying corrupt payments to its leaders. These 
bribes enabled the MNC to avoid strict compliance with existing environmental legislation. As 
Royal Dutch Petroleum’s operations expanded and its destruction of the surrounding 
environment became more pervasive, the Ogoni people, who inhabited the land affected by the 
MNC’s E&P facilities, began to protest Royal Dutch Petroleum’s actions. However, the MNC 
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 This case was filed with the Southern District Court of New York on February 28, 2002. 
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 Writer and activist Ken Saro-Wiwa, who was one of the two leaders executed in 1995, founded MOSOP in 1990. 
The protestor was demonstrating against the bulldozing of her crops in preparation for the construction of Royal 
Dutch Petroleum midstream infrastructure, used to transport unfinished products to refineries for processing. 
ignored these demonstrations, knowing that it had the support of the government. Nigerian law 
also limits the liability of MNCs, further encouraging Royal Dutch Petroleum to ignore the 
protests. As the number of demonstrators grew, however, the company began to view the 
ongoing protests as a nuisance, leading it to allegedly conspire with the government to engage in 
the aforementioned human rights abuses.23 
 Political corruption in Nigeria thus led to denials of the right to life, the right to freedom 
from torture, and the right to peaceful assembly, established by the ICCPR. Further, Royal Dutch 
Petroleum did not respect or promote the right of the Ogoni people to environmental protection 
recommended by the U.N. Human Rights Sub-Commission. The case has currently proceeded to 
the discovery stage, but a motion to dismiss filed by Royal Dutch Petroleum on December 2, 
2003, is pending. 
 
Judicial Corruption 
 Another common type of corruption that has implications for human rights is judicial 
corruption, in which domestic court systems worldwide, designed for the fair enforcement of 
legal frameworks, are subjected to outside influences, rendering these courts partial and biased. 
Judicial corruption is an important consideration in international business because it allows 
MNCs to escape liability for the various types of harm caused by their international operations. 
In ATCA cases, plaintiffs allegedly injured by MNCs know that they will be unable to obtain a 
fair trial in their own court system, let alone justice and compensation, and consequently seek 
redress in U.S. courts. 
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 Royal Dutch Petroleum possibly also feared that some of its local employees might defect in response to pressure 
from the community, which would lower production efficiency, raise costs, and create logistical problems. 
 The enormous backlog in U.S. courts, however, often prevents foreign injured parties 
from securing a court date for many months, or even years. When the plaintiffs actually obtain a 
hearing, the judge presiding over the case faces enormous pressure from various interest groups 
that lobby to have the case dismissed.24 One of the most common legal vehicles utilized by the 
defense to this end is forum non conveniens, defined by LegalDefinitions.com as “a common law 
doctrine that permits a case to be dismissed if there is another forum that is more convenient and 
would serve the interests of justice to litigate elsewhere.”25 The motion to dismiss is often 
successful, with the judge noting that allegations of judicial corruption in the country of 
investment are insufficient for rendering that court system as an inadequate forum for the case, 
and the MNC consequently escapes legal liability. 
 Judicial corruption thus denies plaintiffs the right to obtain a fair trial in court in which 
both parties, the injured locals and the MNC, are equal before the law. Article 2.3 of the ICCPR 
states: 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes: 
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an 
effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an 
official capacity; 
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by competent 
judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by 
the legal system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; 
(c) T o ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted. 
 
Parties seeking relief under the ATCA as a result of being injured in developing countries by 
MNCs are clearly being denied the “effective remedy” to which they are entitled by the ICCPR. 
Article 14.1 of the same covenant states: 
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 Many foreign trade ministers in developing countries believe that holding MNCs responsible for their actions 
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 In the context of ATCA cases, defendants often note that the relevant evidence and victims remain in the country 
of investment, rendering its courts more convenient. Plaintiffs often respond by pointing out that the interests of 
justice are not considered in those courts because corruption prevents the plaintiffs from obtaining a fair trial. 
All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any criminal charge 
against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public 
hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law. The press and the public 
may be excluded from all or part of a trial for reasons of morals, public order or national security in a 
democratic society, or when the interest of the private lives of the parties so requires, or to the extent 
strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the 
interests of justice; but any judgment rendered in a criminal case or in a suit at law shall be made public 
except where the interest of juvenile persons otherwise requires or the proceedings concern matrimonial 
disputes or the guardianship of children. 
 
Judicial corruption prevents the realization of this fairness of courts clause in the ICCPR. 
 The TI GCB provides empirical evidence of the relevance of combating judicial 
corruption. Respondents indicated that after political parties, courts were the institution from 
which elimination of corruption was most desirable. In four of the 44 countries polled – Peru 
(35.0%), Indonesia (32.8%), Cameroon (31.0%), and Luxembourg (18.1%) – courts ranked first. 
Not surprisingly, four ATCA cases – Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan (mining operations in 
Indonesia), Doe v. ExxonMobil (natural gas E&P in Indonesia), Flores v. Southern Peru Copper 
(mining operations in Peru), and Maugein v. Newmont Mining (mining operations in Peru) – 
have been brought against MNCs operating in Peru and Indonesia.26 
 The story behind Maugein v. Newmont Mining began in 1992, when Newmont Mining 
teamed up with Peruvian mining company Buenaventura, the French Mining Bureau, and the 
World Bank’s private-sector investment division to develop the Yanacocha gold mine, a few 
hundred miles north of Lima, Peru. In 1994, the French Mining Bureau announced its intention 
to sell 60% of its 24% interest to Normandy Mining. Newmont Mining and Buenaventura filed 
suit in Peru to block the sale and were victorious, giving Newmont Mining a majority interest in 
the mine. Three years and several appeals later, the Peruvian Supreme Court reconfirmed the 
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decision of the lower courts by a 4-3 vote. Newmont Mining then bought Normandy Mining to 
become the world’s largest producer of gold. 
 Patrick Maugein, chairman of SOCO International, filed a civil racketeering suit against 
Newmont Mining, demanding punitive damages for the consulting fee that he was denied 
because of the Peruvian court decision in favor of Newmont Mining and Buenaventura.27 The 
basis of the suit was the allegation of corruption in the Peruvian courts, which he believed were 
biased in favor of Newmont Mining and Buenaventura. 
 Unfortunately for Maugein, it was not until after the case was dismissed that his 
allegations were substantiated by the discovery of the “vladivideos,” a collection of 
approximately 2,500 videotaped meetings between Peruvian secret service chief Vladimiro 
Montesinos and highly positioned public officials. The videos vividly depict the manner in which 
corruption enabled Montesinos and his boss, former president Alberto Fujimori, to control all 
aspects of the Peruvian public sector. One of the videos made public contains implicating 
evidence of Montesinos bribing a judge to rule in favor of Newmont Mining. Montesinos, now 
serving a nine-year sentence after being found guilty on charges of usurping power, gave sworn 
testimony from jail that the 1997 Peruvian Supreme Court vote was fixed in a conspiracy plot 
involving Newmont Mining, Buenaventura, him, and $4 million. Further substantiating the 
allegations of judicial corruption was a certified audiotape, from the Congress of Peru, of a 
conversation between Montesinos and former Newmont vice president and chief administrative 
officer Lawrence Kurlander, in which the two discuss how to influence the vote. The vladivideos 
and audiotape provide very clear evidence that Newmont Mining has an enormous amount of 
influence on the Peruvian courts. 
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 Judicial corruption can have several downstream human rights ramifications beyond 
denying the right to a fair trial. Four years after the Peruvian Supreme Court vote, another suit 
was filed against Newmont Mining, this time in U.S. courts, in which plaintiffs sought redress 
for a toxic spill that injured more than 1,000 indigenous villagers from the Andean countryside.28 
More than 300 pounds of mercury, a byproduct of the extraction process, leaked along a 25-mile 
stretch of road, causing mercury poisoning among the locals. The spill reinforced allegations of 
recklessness on the part of Newmont Mining, which had been accused in the past of disposing of 
cyanide in an unsafe manner, leading to water and soil contamination and the destruction of plant 
life, livestock, and fish. Newmont Mining’s actions violate Articles 12.1 and 12.2b of the 
ICESCR, which state: 
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health…The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present 
Covenant to achieve the full realization of this right shall include those necessary for the improvement of 
all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene. 
 
Given Newmont Mining’s ability to influence the judiciary, the plaintiffs sought relief under the 
ATCA, but the case was dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds on May 20, 2002. 
 Newmont Mining failed to meet the U.N. Human Rights Sub-Commission’s guidelines 
for companies and human rights in several respects. It not only undermined the Peruvian court 
system by willingly paying bribes and soliciting public officials to do the same, but also acted 
irresponsibly with regard to the health and safety of its operating environment and surrounding 
communities. Newmont Mining, through judicial corruption, prevented those harmed by its 
actions from obtaining adequate relief in the only forum deemed convenient and available to the 
injured parties. 
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Police/Military Corruption 
 A third type of corruption that frequently has human rights implications is that which 
occurs in relation to the police and military. Defined by Merriam-Webster as the “organization or 
regulation of a political unit through exercise of governmental powers especially with respect to 
general comfort, health, morals, safety, or prosperity,” the police and military forces are public 
institutions designed to ensure the security and welfare of a nation’s citizens both internally and 
externally. When officials of these institutions engage in corruption, they knowingly fail to 
perform their ascribed function, and instead neglect or negatively impact the security and welfare 
of the citizens that they are supposed to protect. Neglect is considered passive in this spectrum of 
corruption; it consists of non-intervention when their job function normally calls them to action. 
Negative impact is considered active; it consists of taking measures that cause actual harm to the 
population. 
 A notable case tied to this form of corruption is Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola, in which 
plaintiffs working for Coca-Cola bottling plants in Colombia alleged that the company cruelly 
denied the right of its workers to form unions.29 Trouble for Adolfo de Jesus Munera, a regional 
leader of the Sinaltrainal food industry workers’ union, began in 1997 when the plant chief 
accused him of being a sympathizer with Colombian rebel forces. Army troops raided his house, 
forcing him to flee the region. Coca-Cola then sent him a letter announcing his termination for 
not showing up at work, prompting Munera to file suit in Colombia and demand his job back. 
 After obtaining a favorable ruling in the lower court and having the ruling overturned in 
the appellate court, Munera had his case accepted by the Colombian Constitutional Court on 
August 22, 2002. He was shot to death nine days later, becoming the eighth union leader from a 
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 The case was filed with the Southern District Court of Florida on July 20, 2001, on behalf of the five union 
leaders that hitherto had been murdered, tortured, and/or unlawfully detained. Although Munera was not one of 
those five, his story is representative of the circumstances that the other union leaders faced. 
Coca-Cola plant in Colombia to be murdered through 2002. Coca-Cola’s actions are part of a 
larger trend among MNCs operating in Colombia, as nearly 4,000 union activists from the 
national union federation have been assassinated in the past 20 years without detailed 
investigations and prosecutions.30 Sinaltrainal alleged in its ATCA filing that Coca-Cola 
knowingly paid these paramilitary units to bring destruction to the union. 
 Plaintiffs suggest that the alignment of interests between these assassin squads and the 
world’s most recognized brand name can be explained by nothing other than corruption. Instead 
of protecting the rights of workers, the police and military units, now financially supported by 
Coca-Cola, are in fact denying the human rights of local employees and abusing the human 
rights of regional union leaders. In addition to the human rights of life and freedom from torture 
mentioned above, the ICCPR also stipulates a right to freedom from unlawful detainment. 
Article 9.1 of the ICCPR states: 
Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or 
detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such 
procedure as are established by law. 
 
Furthermore, the raid of Munera’s home and the defamation of his reputation by the plant chief 
violate Article 17 of the ICCPR, which states: 
1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honor and reputation. 
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks. 
 
Instead of protecting Munera and others from these attacks, Coca-Cola and the paramilitary units 
engaged in the attacks. This form of corruption also leads to violations of rights with respect to 
unions, validated by the ICCPR and the core covenants of the International Labor Organization. 
Article 22 of the ICCPR states: 
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and 
join trade unions for the protection of his interests. 
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2. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those which are prescribed by law 
and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, 
public order, the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others. This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on members of the armed 
forces and of the police in their exercise of this right. 
3. Nothing in this article shall authorize States Parties to the International Labor Organization Convention 
of 1948 concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize to take legislative 
measures which would prejudice, or to apply the law in such a manner as to prejudice, the guarantees 
provided for in that Convention. 
 
As unions represent the ability to collectively bargain and improve the conditions of workers on 
a continual basis, it is likely that Coca-Cola and other MNCs oppose unions because they 
contribute to higher labor costs and their contracts add undesirable legal responsibility. With 
respect to the recommendations outlined by the U.N. Human Rights Sub-Commission, Coca-
Cola is failing to ensure that its Colombian workers are safe and healthy, given the freedom of 
association, and allowed to engage in collective bargaining. On March 31, 2003, the court 
granted Coca-Cola’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
 Several other cases, including Estate of Rodriguez v. Drummond (coal mine operations in 
Colombia), Doe v. Unocal (gas pipeline project in Burma), and Villeda v. Fresh Del Monte 
Produce (banana plantations in Guatemala), involve situations similar to that of Sinaltrainal v. 
Coca-Cola.31 In each case, there are premeditated assaults on unionization by paramilitary units. 
Doe v. Unocal involves another type of human rights abuse resulting from corruption in the 
police and military, that of forced labor. Articles 8.3a and 8.3b of the ICCPR state: 
(a) No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labor; 
(b) Paragraph 3 (a) shall not be held to preclude, in countries where imprisonment with hard labor may be 
imposed as a punishment for a crime, the performance of hard labor in pursuance of a sentence to such 
punishment by a competent court. 
 
These cases collectively provide strong evidence of the damaging effects that corruption of the 
police and military can have on human rights in an international business context. 
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 The human rights ramifications of this form of corruption can extend beyond abuse of 
plant workers and environmental destruction. In Bowoto v. Chevron, plaintiffs alleged human 
rights abuses exacted on peaceful demonstrators by military squads transported by Chevron 
vehicle units.32 The villagers were protesting the environmental destruction of the Niger Delta 
resulting from the MNC’s dredging operations. Petitions signed by residents went unheeded, 
leading unarmed locals to an offshore platform to protest Chevron’s actions and demand a 
meeting between community elders and Chevron representatives. 
 On May 28, 1998, soldiers, carried in Chevron-leased helicopters operated by company 
pilots, violated the right of peaceful assembly by opening fire on the protestors, who lacked 
weapons and showed no indications of desiring a violent confrontation. Given that Chevron 
security personnel on the platform were armed, it would be both irrational and extremely 
dangerous for the local villagers to want anything except to verbally express their dissatisfaction 
with Chevron’s operations. Instead of ensuring the security and welfare of the population, the 
soldiers, financially and materially supported by Chevron, engaged in abuses of human rights. 
Under the recommendations of the U.N. Human Rights Sub-Commission, Chevron has a 
responsibility to respect and promote the rights of the U.N. covenants in its operating 
community. Instead, the MNC engaged the military and its officials to disregard their fiduciary 
responsibility to the population. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment was denied on 
March 23, 2004, and the outcome of the case is pending. 
 
Recommendations 
 The aforementioned ATCA cases suggest that corruption does have significant, negative 
externalities relating to human rights. Given that human rights abuses result from political, 
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judicial, and police/military corruption, the next step is to reexamine the cases from a macro 
perspective and identify possible ways to curb corruption. 
 Corruption is able to persist because there is supply of and demand for it. Consequently, 
both the payers and recipients of bribes should be held accountable for its existence.33 The 
ATCA cases relevant to political and police/military corruption indicate that a great deal of 
importance should be placed on dealing with the supply side of corruption. In international 
business, supply-side responsibility often falls on MNCs, which are based in some of the world’s 
wealthiest nations.34 These MNCs have enormous economies of scale and multi-billion dollar 
market caps, and are consequently in the best position to shape policy concerns in developing 
countries. Regarding MNCs and their role in perpetuating corruption, there are three main issues 
that must be addressed – lack of awareness, poor enforcement mechanisms, and failure to 
consider relevant stakeholders. 
 According to one of the surveys comprising the TI 2002 Bribe Payers Index, in which 
Gallup International surveyed business experts across 15 leading emerging market economies, 
only 19% of respondents were aware of the OECD convention criminalizing bribery. In a press 
release accompanying the 2002 BPI, TI Chairman Peter Eigen noted, “The convention does not 
seem to have made any difference, so far, to the bribery approaches of many multinational 
firms.” The results suggest that there is a definite and immediate need to raise awareness. 
 Awareness campaigns in MNCs need to be a top-down effort. Executives must have a 
firm understanding of what corruption entails and the negative consequences of participating in 
it. Only then can awareness be effectively disseminated throughout the organization. 
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 This statement does not assume that there are no other sources of corruption. In the oil industry, for example, 
domestic corporations also pay bribes to public officials and are often politically aligned with them. In inter-
institutional corruption of the public sector, government officials are at both ends of the flow of corrupt payments. 
Furthermore, companies should hire consultants to evaluate the quality and effectiveness of their 
whistle-blowing programs. Does the program produce results? Have adequate steps been taken to 
protect the anonymity of the process? Does the whistle blower suffer negative fallout from his or 
her action afterwards? An effective whistle-blowing program has the potential not only to 
identify those engaged in corrupt activities, but also hinders other employees from participating 
in them. Aside from the possibility of improving its public relations image, though, a company 
has very little incentive to add these overhead costs.35 Consequently, the most effective way to 
push these types of measures through is via industry-wide efforts. 
 The need for effective whistle-blowing programs within each corporation alludes to 
another uphill battle in the effort to curb corruption, which is finding effective ways to enforce 
existing conventions. Organizations like the OECD have drafted document after document 
condemning corruption, and even criminalizing it. However, without proper enforcement, 
corruption will continue to flourish. There have hitherto been no convictions under the OECD 
convention against bribery. Enforcement of such conventions requires a collaborative effort of 
the domestic court systems of both the source and recipient of investment. At the source, tangible 
negative reinforcement, such as heavy fines and investment restrictions, must be levied on those 
individuals and their corporations found in violation of the convention. On the receiving end, 
judicial infrastructure must show dramatic improvement. Possible changes in the court systems 
of many developing countries seeking investment include greater independence of the judiciary 
from government and MNCs, as well as increased liability for foreign corporations in the country 
of investment. Failure to show progress towards these changes should lead to punishment via 
investment sanctions. 
                                                 
35
 This statement assumes that the corporation collectively adopts a bottom-line perspective; that is, it will not 
simply act on the basis of moral goodness. 
 The other main piece of the supply-side puzzle is the failure of MNCs operating in 
developing countries to consider relevant stakeholders. In the years pre-dating stakeholder 
analysis, stakeholder and shareholder were virtually synonymous. That is, the only concern of 
the corporation was maximizing profit. Today, however, relevant stakeholders in addition to 
equity shareholders include employees, suppliers, customers, and the community.36 While MNCs 
appear to consider these stakeholders domestically, the same cannot be generally said of their 
operations abroad.37 There is a large discrepancy, for example, between the domestic and foreign 
environmental standards to which MNCs adhere. While MNCs should not be forced to adopt the 
exact same standards abroad as they do at home, they should take into further consideration the 
fact that they are citizens of the communities in which they invest and operate. ATCA cases, 
however, reveal that MNCs view their foreign operations as profit generators, leading to 
mistreatment of local populations and environmental destruction. 
 Awareness programs concerning the environment abroad may be difficult to implement 
alone, and consequently should be complemented by the raising of environmental standards 
worldwide.38 Contrary to the belief of many foreign governments, research shows that raising 
environmental standards within a given country does not damage the level of FDI. To further 
alleviate such concerns, an international convention, like those concerning human rights and 
corruption, should be drafted to describe in greater detail the minimal environmental standards to 
which all ratifying nations must adhere. Diverging opinions across the world may result in slow 
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 Then again, MNCs may not be engaging in stakeholder analysis domestically either, and instead are simply trying 
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 Objections to these efforts are important to consider. The Bamako Convention, for example, prohibits members of 
the European Union from engaging in waste tourism to African nations. Critics, including several African nations, 
suggest that these conventions are violations of both national sovereignty and market efficiency. A country ought to 
be able to do what it pleases with its own territory, given the right price. These critics fail to consider, however, the 
disparity between developed and developing countries, which would only continue to expand without a certain 
degree of regulation. 
progress, but the U.N. Convention against Corruption testifies to the potential benefit of such 
efforts. 
 Increased awareness, better enforcement, and stakeholder analysis can combine to have a 
dramatically positive impact in the world’s efforts to curb corruption. Instead of waiting to be 
scrutinized and criticized for their position on human rights and reacting accordingly, MNCs 
should adopt a proactive approach in promoting and respecting the principles outlined for 
companies by the U.N. Human Rights Sub-Commission. 
 
Conclusion 
 The history of corruption probably dates back to the creation of the first social structure, 
in which public authority was vested in an individual responsible for using it to benefit the 
community. However, a lengthy history is not a valid excuse for allowing it to persist.39 
Furthermore, qualitative research of ATCA cases suggests that political, judicial, and 
police/military corruption have important negative implications in the realm of human rights. 
These forms of corruption lead to injuries and deaths among local populations, as well as 
devastation of the environment. Addressing the supply side of these forms of corruption seems to 
be a good place to start, given the influence of MNCs on the policies of developing countries. 
However, a long-term approach must also consider ways to reduce the demand for bribes by 
public officials. Although even the most optimistic researchers in the field are pessimistic about 
the likelihood of eradicating corruption completely, the U.N. Convention against Corruption 
suggests that even small steps of progress are beneficial to the global community. 
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Future Research 
 This paper concluded that corruption does have human rights implications. Both the anti-
corruption movement and the human rights movement have large international organizations 
with local chapters around the world. Are there ways for Amnesty and TI to work together so 
that the goals of both organizations are achieved? Do synergies exist? 
 One of the major recommendations of this paper is that there must be a greater degree of 
judicial autonomy in developing countries. What tangible ways are there to strengthen judicial 
autonomy? Effective measures towards this end would not only reduce the pressure on U.S. 
courts to hear cases involving international law violations abroad, but would also reduce 
instances of corruption and human rights abuse in the country of investment. Judicial autonomy 
from the influences of political leaders and MNCs would also force companies to abide by 
higher working and environmental standards. 
 Although this paper highlighted the failures of several MNCs in their operations abroad, a 
number of companies have served as pioneers in the anti-corruption and human rights 
movements, proactively adopting higher standards with significant consequences for failing to 
adhere to them. Which MNCs materially consider these two fields as important business issues? 
What strategies have they employed to demonstrate their commitment to curbing corruption and 
fighting against abuses of human rights? Are these strategies transferable across countries and 
industries? 
 The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention has been in force for more than five years, and yet 
there have been zero convictions resulting from it. Certainly part of the problem is a lack of 
awareness, highlighted by the results of the TI 2002 BPI. Are there other ways to make the 
convention a more effective legal mechanism? 
 The U.N. Convention against Corruption merges international opinions concerning 
corruption into one cohesive document, and has consequently generated a significant amount of 
excitement with regards to its potential in the anti-corruption movement. What effect will the 
convention have on attitudes towards corruption among political leaders, businesspeople, and the 
general population? What factors suggest that this convention will or will not suffer a fate similar 
to the OCED Anti-Bribery Convention? 
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